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A faint feeling of futility is what you might experience if you look at the EU’s efforts
to fight the erosion of the rule of law and what they have achieved so far. The
right-wing populist landslide, foretold by some, has failed to materialise in the
EP elections, but that does not apply to countries where the right-wing populists
are in government: In Poland, Hungary and Italy they have won triumphantly.
Hungary’s Fidesz party is just making itself comfortable in the EPP again with a
ostentatiously unapologetic grin on its face, and while everyone is busy worrying
over Poland, Bulgaria’s governing party, firmly anchored in the EPP, feels
secure enough to undertake a rather blunt attempt to subjugate its independent
judiciary of its own. Malta has a so-called "social democratic" government which
is nonetheless frighteningly successful in its efforts to make their commitment to
the rule of law a matter of political expediency while no one in Europe seems even
to bother. The exception that confirms the rule is Romania whose also "social
democratic" governing party apparently did pay a political price for its attacks on the
independence of the judiciary, and a criminal-law price on top of it.
The realisation that the EU is in real and existential trouble with respect to the rule
of law is now largely a matter of course in most parts, but helplessness prevails all
the more about the question of what can be done about it. The EU Commission
has announced to come forward with new proposals in June. In preparation, there
was a workshop organised by Carlos Closa and Miguel Maduro on Friday at the
European University Institute in Florence at which the current Vice-President and
Spitzenkandidat for President of the EU Commission, Frans Timmermans, consulted
with a round of heavyweight experts and stakeholders, including members of half
a dozen constitutional courts. I had the privilege to attend, and to anticipate the
outcome: the EU’s toolbox is not as empty as it sometimes seems. A great deal
could actually be done. Which raises the question of why it isn’t.
Outsourced
At the moment all hopes seem to focus on the European Court of Justice: In two
weeks, the Court will hand down its decision on the question of whether Poland’s
forced retirement scheme for its Supreme Court has violated its treaty obligation to
preserve the independence of its judiciary. The options available to the ECJ in this
regard were the subject of an online symposium on Verfassungsblog last week, and
few doubt that the answer will be in the affirmative, which would, in conjunction with
a number of other referral and infringement decisions, effectively take most of the fun
out of suppressing the judiciary for the PiS government, or so we hope.
To dump the whole responsibility for ensuring the rule of law in Poland on the ECJ
means, however, that others can go unburdened by it – a depoliticisation of this
epochal conflict, as if preserving the rule of law were not a matter of political will but
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solely of legal necessity. Whether such uncritical legalism is favourable for the court
is disputable from a judicial perspective, too, which became very clear in Florence
(Chatham House rules applied). Three members of different constitutional courts
expressed great concern about the increasing use of the judiciary to arbitrate hot
political conflicts. One warned against the tendency of the judiciary to succumb to
the "intellectual temptation" of regarding themselves competent to decide what’s best
for all. One judge, however, emphasized that constitutional courts are per se political
and have to deal with it. (That judge came from a court which had suffered some
loss of authority for being perceived as too political.)
I wish I knew what the ECJ and its President Koen Lennaerts think about this, but I
don’t. Additionally, the position of the Luxembourg court is being made delicate by
the fact that its judges, for their part, are elected in a way that is not exactly orthodox
either: political selection, a non-transparent procedure, a short term of office with the
possibility of re-election – not entirely what the Venice Commission recommends to
ensure judicial independence, one must say.
Speaking of the Venice Commission: another variant of outsourcing the fight for
the rule of law in Europe is the installation of independent expert committees.
Manfred Weber recently brought up something like this, with help from the former
constitutional judge turned writer/pundit/high-yield-expert-opinions-deliverer Udo
Di Fabio. This may have been a smart move from a PR point of view, with Weber,
who until recently smothered Orbán with his love and affection, suddenly staging
himself as quite the determined fighter against those terrible, terrible rule of law
endangerers. In terms of substance, however, Weber’s proposal for an independent
monitoring body consisting of nine retired constitutional judges (in the image of Di
Fabio, one might suspect), exuding wisdom and benignancy and lacking all political
authority and clout, would amount to little more than reinterpreting the question of
political will as a question of academic knowledge and to further depoliticize the fight
for the rule of law.
The toolbox is not empty
Weber is also one of those who like to complain a lot about how terribly ill-equipped
the EU is for this fight. Article 7, rule-of-law dialogue, infringement proceedings –
oh dear, none of this really helped, it all takes too long, it can be blocked by the
states concerned! "The tools were all there at the beginning of this crisis," one of the
participants in Florence remarked dryly, "but the crisis was taken as a sign that there
are no tools".
Two professors of European law well known to the readers of Verfassungsblog,
Laurent Pech and Dimitry Kochenov, together with seven other experts, have
recently compiled a wealth of suggestions and ideas for the Commission on what
could be done with the existing instruments. Some of their suggestions were
already elaborated on here on Verfassungsblog, such as Kim Scheppele and Dan
Kelemen’s hint (courtesy of Israel Butler) that the EU Commission can already
withhold structural funds on the basis of existing secondary legislation if there is
a "serious deficiency in the effective functioning of the management and control
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system of the operational programme" (Art. 142 EU Directive 1305/2013). Or András
Jakab’s suggestion to the European Parliament to defend itself against infiltration by
members who owe their mandate to a democratically questionable election.
Taking up all these tools and using them in a transparent and visible way would
also have the advantage that they would make tangible and give case quality to
what is actually happening all the time in Hungary, Poland and elsewhere. There
are still many who find that quite literally unbelievable, and it’s easy to see why:
that no-one in Hungary will ever get a cent of EU funding but the Orbán cronies
who fund his party, that EU money is actually what keeps this kleptocratic regime
financially afloat the way oil does with any old petrostate dictatorship – it’s not an
easy thing to wrap your head around. That Hungary imprisons refugees and at the
same time refuses them food until they "voluntarily" leave for Serbia, and that every
single person concerned must first obtain an injunction at the Human Rights Court in
Strasbourg in order to, for Christ’s sake, eat. That a judge from Gdansk is accused
right now by the disciplinary prosecutor of having received "financial gratification"
from a defendant which, it turns out, was in fact the "Gdansk equality award" she
had been given by the late city president and victim of right-wing extremist murder
Pawe# Adamowicz, to mention just one of countless equally or even more belief-
defying cases of disciplinary harassment and intimidation of judges happening at this
very moment in Poland. Yes. You wouldn’t want to believe that. You’d much prefer
to keep that away from you. You’d much rather close your eyes really tight. The least
the Commission, the Council and the other institutions involved can do is to make us
open them.
Air supply
In Bulgaria, as already mentioned, the government is trying to get the president of
the Supreme Court of Cassation, one of its harshest critics, under its disciplinary
control. SIMEON STOYCHEV reports what this is all about.
In Germany, the independence of the judiciary may be less safe as one might think,
according to some. On the occasion of the recent judgment of the ECJ in the matter
of German public prosecutors and EU arrest warrants, THOMAS GROSS demands
to reduce the political influence on the appointment of judges and thus to improve
the constitutional resilience of Germany.
The German debate about the introduction of a basic pension threatens to be stifled
by constitutional objections of questionable merit, and ASTRID WALLRABENSTEIN
is doing her best to provide it with some oxygen.
LAURA DEREJE joins the discussion about Youtube stars blamed by CDU
chairwoman Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer for wielding unregulated "opinion-making
power" in Germany, and calls for some minimum standards of diligence for "amateur
journalists".
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KONRAD LACHMAYER and LUKAS WIESER map the uncharted constitutional
territory entered by Austrian politics with the fall of Chancellor Kurz and the
formation of a temporary expert government.
DENNIS-KENJI KIPKER analyses the German government considerations as to
how to answer to a cyber attack from abroad, and BENJAMIN DERIN does the same
with the cabinet plans to curtail the criminal procedural rights of accused persons
and defenders.
Elsewhere
EMIL W. LORENZ examines whether the Speaker of the German Bundestag was
entitled to reprimand an AfD MP for his attacks against the head of state.
JULIAN CLARENNE criticises the failure of the ECtHR to problematise the
competence of parliamentary committees to resolve post-electoral conflicts in a
Belgian case.
LYNDA COLLINS demands that environmental sustainability should be recognized
as an unwritten constitutional principle in Canada.
BENJAMIN FARGEAUD asks whether it serves parliamentarianism well in France to
hand over a right-wing extremist denying the Holocaust at a parliamentary hearing to
the judiciary.
JOHN T. NELSON is not convinced that Julian Assange will be extradited to the
USA.
THOMAS E. KELLOGG is concerned about plans in Hong Kong to facilitate
extradition to China.
So much for this week. By the way, in case you wonder why you receive this notice
later than usual: on the way back from Florence my sleeper train, already two and a
half hours late, came to an unscheduled halt in a hamlet called Tittmoning-Wiesmühl
and didn’t go any further; I have spent the rest of Saturday making my way back to
Berlin from that untrodden spot of Bavarian idyllic rurality. It’s now half past six in
the evening, I am somewhere between Bamberg and Erfurt after another train broke
down in Upper Franconia (isn’t that just my luck), I have stopped counting the train
changes and haven’t eaten anything all day except for a Leberkässemmel at Munich
Central Station and yet I am still firmly convinced that it should be possible to take a
train from A to B in Germany.
All the best for you, and take care,
Max Steinbeis
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